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Looking Backward, Looking Forward
President John F. Kennedy speaks before a crowd of 35,000 people at Rice
University on 12 September 1962. NASA Image 69-HC-1245.
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I want to ask all of you to join me for a few minutes in a men-
tal experiment. There is a certain sense of determinism as we
review a period of history, like the forty years of U.S. human
spaceflight. There is an implicit assumption that there were no
alternatives to the way things happened. If you step back even
half a step, you know that’s not true; that along the way, history
could have been very different if different choices had been
made, if different events had happened. So I have arbitrarily
picked a few situations in those forty years and invite you to ask
along with me: “What if things had been different?” 
This notion of counterfactual history has some legitimacy.
I have used it as a class assignment for my students in space policy,
asking them to write about what might have occurred if different
choices had been made. Dwayne Day, a former student and now
a colleague, has suggested a whole symposium on counterfactual
space history, and that might be an interesting thing to do someday.
As I looked into preparation for this talk, I discovered there is a
body of literature on counterfactual history. And, not surprisingly
in the Internet age, there are even Web sites devoted to the topic!
So let us start with the first “what if.” The Mercury
Redstone 2 flight on 31 January 1961 carried the chimpanzee
Ham. It went too high and too fast. Ham experienced over 10-Gs
on reentry, and the spacecraft landed several hundred miles
down range. He was a very angry chimpanzee when rescue teams
reached the Mercury capsule. The problem that caused the devi-
ation in flight trajectory turned out to be very simple to identify;
it was quickly diagnosed as a malfunctioning valve. It could have
been fixed, and the next flight, which had been scheduled to
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and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997).
carry the first astronaut, could have been launched without an
intermediate test flight. But even in those days, safety was criteria
number one. So Wernher von Braun and his team insisted on a flight
of the repaired booster with a dummy spacecraft; that flight took
place on 24 March 1961. The reality is if the 31 January flight
had been successful, then the 24 March flight could have carried
Alan Shepard. He would have been the first human in space, not
Yuri Gagarin.
What might have been the impacts of that? It is reasonable
to speculate that the Soviet reaction, the U.S. reaction to Yuri
Gagarin’s flight, President Kennedy’s subsequent reaction to the
Gagarin flight, the press reaction, and the political reaction that
provided the fuel for Kennedy to ask his advisors to find a dra-
matic space program with which the United States could “win”
might all have been entirely different. It is quite possible that the
United States would not have decided to try to surpass the Soviet
Union in spectacular space achievements. Then a very different
space history would certainly have evolved.
Here is another possibility. In President Kennedy’s inaugural
State of the Union address, he invited the Soviet Union to coop-
erate in the exploration of space. In fact, early on, he had tar-
geted space as an area for trying to develop mutual confidence
and reduce tensions with our Cold War adversary. Kennedy was
forced by the reaction to the Gagarin flight to compete, but he
never gave up the cooperative idea. There’s a book called One
Hell of a Gamble1 that traces the fact that Kennedy, between the
22785-looking back book final 2  11/20/02  1:13 PM  Page 84
85
time he received the memo recommending Apollo and the time
he announced Apollo on 25 May 1961, kept asking the Soviet
Union “might you want to cooperate in space?” He received no
response from the Soviets, so he went ahead with his speech on
25 May. Ten days later, in Vienna, he met Nikita Khrushchev for
the one and only time and suggested “Why don’t we go to the
Moon together?” As Asif Siddiqi has suggested, at that point, the
Soviet Union didn’t have a lunar program, really didn’t take the
United States very seriously, and the official party line was to
link cooperation to general and complete disarmament. So there
was no positive response from Khrushchev.
Kennedy never really went away from the idea. In September
1963, at the United Nations in the most public possible way, he
suggested, “Why should this be a matter of national rivalry?
Why don’t we do it together?” Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, has
written that at that point the Soviet leader was beginning to
think more about cooperation. Kennedy, ten days before he was
assassinated, sent a memo to Jim Webb asking for a plan to coop-
erate with the Soviet Union in space, including a cooperative
lunar-landing effort.
What would have happened if Khrushchev’s answer had
been yes? Well, there are lots of possibilities. If the answer had
been yes at Vienna in 1961, for example, the political support
that made Apollo possible likely would have collapsed. This
political support was based on competition, on the idea of the
United States gaining a preeminent position in space. So if the
Soviet Union had accepted Kennedy’s offer, I’m not sure Apollo
would have ever happened.
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Could the Soviet Union have carried out its part of the pro-
gram if cooperation had taken place? It is not clear whether the
post-Khrushchev leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin would
have been as committed to this. It is also debatable whether the
Soviet Union could have contributed to the program in the ways
that would have made international cooperation possible.
Alternatively, if Kennedy had not been assassinated ten
days after he had signed the government directive to find ways
of cooperation, perhaps cooperation could have worked. Maybe
the United States and the Soviet Union, the leading space pow-
ers in the 1960s, could have found a way to join forces. If that
had happened, other things such as the International Space
Station might have happened much sooner. It would have set a
precedent for collaboration in space exploration which we are
working on making succeed now. We might have been able to
start down the cooperative path thirty to thirty-five years ago. 
Here is another counterfactual notion to consider. Most of
you are familiar with the 1969 recommendations of the Space
Task Group that the U.S. accept a post-Apollo goal of manned
planetary exploration before the end of the century and build a
series of large space stations during the 1970s as steps toward
that goal. What if, instead of rejecting that report out of hand in
the aftermath of Apollo, Nixon said, “Yes, we’ll do that.” What
might have happened? There is a fascinating book called Voyage,2
by British engineer Stephen Baxter, that starts with exactly this
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premise. The novel describes the first mission to Mars in the
1980s! It’s a very enjoyable piece of counterfactual history.
If we had kept the Saturn V, if we had launched a 33-foot
diameter instead of a 15-foot diameter Space Station, launched
with one Saturn V flight by the late 1970s, where would we have
been? What kind of Space Shuttle would we have built? If the
Shuttle had been developed primarily as the supply vehicle for
the station, we might have been able to build a fully reusable,
straight-winged, highly operable vehicle. The Space Task Group
report called for the initial mission to Mars in 1986 or, in the
extremely ambitious von Braun version, 1982. We might have
been at Mars by now if the choice to set that destination as a
goal had been made over three decades ago. 
We have all gotten used to the concept of an International Space
Station. There was not a whole lot of debate leading up to President
Reagan’s late 1983 approval of the Space Station, of whether it should
be international or not. The advocates of the international approach
knew that there was opposition within the Reagan administration.
So they didn’t have it debated as part of the original decision package.
The decision to make the station international came at high levels
of the administration in the weeks before Reagan’s announcement of
the Space Station in January 1984. But what if the program had been
a U.S.-only Space Station? What if we had not included international
partnership? Would the station have survived its many budget
and schedule problems over the past two decades? Howard
McCurdy has written in his book, The Space Station Decision,3
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that approval of the station was a very marginal decision in terms
of political support. When the station ran into problems in the
1980s and 1990s, without the international partnerships, I think
the program would have been much more vulnerable and likely
would have been canceled.
But there is an alternative possibility. The international
character of the station program added cost and complexity to
the program. If there had been no international involvement, the
program might have gone forward, with NASA and its contrac-
tors settling on a feasible design that could be built within
budget and on schedule.
What if the decision had been made to postpone Challenger
because of the weather conditions on that January morning, and,
when the mission was rescheduled and launched, would it have
been successful? I think subsequent history would have been
much different. Here are just some of the possibilities. Maybe
there was an accident waiting to happen because of the attitude
of increasing acceptance of risk. If the accident had not come on
flight 51-L, it would have come sooner rather than later, and the
consequences for the program wouldn’t have been much differ-
ent. Another possible scenario is that the Shuttle would have
become increasingly reliable. The Shuttle would have continued
to carry commercial and military payloads, not just NASA pay-
loads. The plan at the time of Challenger was to launch twenty-
four flights per year. We might have approximated that with
adequate budget and improvements in reliability.
We would not have a commercial ELV industry if that had
happened. Certainly the Challenger accident opened a window
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of opportunity. So maybe we would be using the Shuttle in a very
different way than we are today.
Another possibility is that eventually the fixation on a
Shuttle-only policy would have changed. We would have evolved
into a more balanced and appropriate mixed-fleet strategy and
be about where we are now. 
Here is a final counterfactual possibility. The notion of
inviting Russia to join the Space Station program has multiple
parents, including Dan Goldin, Yuri Koptev and Yuri Semenov
in Russia, and Leon Furth, who was Al Gore’s National Security
Advisor. There were many reasons to invite Russia into the pro-
gram, but it was not a straightforward yes or no proposition.
There was some significant skepticism about the wisdom of the
idea. If Russia hadn’t been included in the International Space
Station program, what might have happened instead?
It may help to recall that in June 1993, the House of
Representatives approved the NASA budget, including the Space
Station, by one vote, 216 to 215. Bringing Russia in changed
that to a hundred vote margin the next year. The Space Station
was on the path to cancellation in the early years of the Clinton
administration. It is thus a very plausible claim that bringing
Russia into the partnership saved the station program, and,
without Russia, it would have been canceled, and we would not
have had to worry about all the problems with Russia as a partner.
Looking back at that period, the redesign team and then
the advisory group to the White House, headed by MIT president
Charles Vest, had several options that they looked at without
Russian involvement. They believed that there were some good
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options for a station redesign. It is possible that we could have
come out with a good station program, on budget, on schedule,
if Russia had not been brought into the partnership.
A final possibility is that what has happened would indeed
have occurred. As the United States and its existing partners
found out how hard the station was and grappled with running
the program as a multinational venture, including crew rescue
vehicles and all the power modules that are required, the pro-
gram would have ended up looking more or less as it has looked
over the past decade.
I think the point of this exercise in counterfactual thinking
is twofold—first, to recognize that not only have choices been
made in the past that defined the character of what has hap-
pened and that different choices were possible and would have
led to different outcomes, and, second, that we are currently
making similar choices for the future. Today’s choices obviously
will have significant long-term consequences for space develop-
ment. Decision-makers have an image of a desirable future when
they make choices, but they also realize that the link between
current choice and desired result is always uncertain. As the
philosopher Yogi Berra is often quoted as having said, “making
predictions is hard, especially when they are about the future.”
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